[2024] 4 S.C.R. 241 : 2024 INSC 286
Pathupati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. v. The Special Deputy Collector (LA)
[Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 31248 of 2018] 08 April 2024
[Bela M. Trivedi and Pankaj Mithal,* JJ.]
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 241 : 2024 INSC 286
SUBJECT: Limitation Act 1963
Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court was justified in refusing to condone the delay of 5659 days in filing the proposed appeal against the judgment of the reference court under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, by some of the Legal Representatives of a deceased Claimant who died pending the reference and who were not impleaded in the reference proceeding.
Judgement Synopsis:
15 Facts Points:
1. Land in Gandluru village, Guntur District, Andhra Pradesh was acquired in 1989 for the Telugu Ganga Project.
2. In L.A.O.P. No. 38 of 1990, there were 16 claimants, and during the pendency of the reference, claimants No. 1, 3, and 11 died.
3. No steps were taken to substitute the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased claimants.
4. The reference was dismissed on merits by a common judgment and order dated 24.09.1999, upholding the Collector’s award.
5. After 5/6 years, some legal representatives of the deceased claimant No. 11 proposed to file an appeal with a delay of 5659 days.
6. No other claimant or their legal heirs joined the proposed appeal.
7. An application was filed for condonation of the delay of 5659 days in filing the proposed appeal.
8. The explanation given was that the surviving daughter of the deceased claimant No. 11 came to know about the dismissal of the reference on 28.05.2015.
9. The High Court refused to condone the delay and dismissed the application as barred by limitation.
10. The present Special Leave Petition challenges the High Court’s order refusing to condone the delay.
11. The Law of Limitation is based on public policy and the maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” (there must be an end to litigation).
12. Section 3 of the Limitation Act is mandatory, and Section 5 is discretionary, allowing condonation of delay upon showing sufficient cause.
13. Liberal interpretation of “sufficient cause” cannot override the substantive law of limitation under Section 3.
14. The merits of the case cannot be considered while deciding the condonation of delay.
15. The High Court’s discretion in refusing to condone the inordinate delay was justified due to the claimants’ negligence and lack of due diligence.
20 Law Points:
1. The law of limitation is founded on public policy and enshrined in the legal maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation).
2. Statutes of limitation and prescription are statutes of peace and repose, envisaging that a right not exercised or remedy not availed for a long time ceases to exist.
3. Section 3 of the Limitation Act is a substantive provision of mandatory nature and needs to be interpreted strictly.
4. Section 5 of the Limitation Act is a discretionary provision and has to be interpreted liberally, as it helps courts do substantial justice.
5. The existence of ‘sufficient cause’ for condoning delay is a condition precedent to exercise the discretionary power to condone delay under Section 5.
6. Even after ‘sufficient cause’ is established, the court has discretion to allow or dismiss the application for condonation of delay based on the bona fides of the party.
7. The discretion to condone delay will not be exercised when the delay is caused by negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides.
8. Equity has no place in condoning delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
9. Courts cannot condone delay on grounds of sympathy or compassion if mandatory provisions are not complied with.
10. Concepts like ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’, and ‘substantial justice’ cannot override the substantive law of limitation under Section 3.
11. The merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing appeals.
12. Law of limitation bars time-barred remedy rather than the right itself with the passage of time.
13. The interplay between Sections 3 and 5 requires that Section 3 be construed strictly, and Section 5 be construed liberally.
14. The discretionary power to condone delay under Section 5 may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established, based on factors like inordinate delay, negligence, and lack of due diligence.
15. Merely obtaining relief in similar matters does not entitle others to the same benefit if the cause shown for delay is unsatisfactory.
16. Delay condonation applications must be decided based on the parameters laid down for condoning delay, and not by disregarding statutory provisions.
17. The court has to exercise discretion systematically and in an informed manner while allowing applications for condonation of delay.
18. Imposition of conditions while condoning delay without finding sufficient cause is not the correct approach.
19. The law of limitation bars stale matters from being revived by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
20. The court cannot ignore the statutory provision of limitation to relieve distress resulting from its operation.
15 Judgement Points:
1. The law of limitation is based on public policy enshrined in the maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” (there must be an end to litigation).
2. Statutes of limitation are statutes of peace and repose, barring remedy rather than the right with the passage of time.
3. Section 3 of the Limitation Act, being a substantive provision of mandatory nature, needs to be interpreted strictly.
4. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, being a discretionary provision, has to be interpreted liberally, but the existence of ‘sufficient cause’ is a condition precedent for condoning delay.
5. Discretionary power to condone delay under Section 5 may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established, in cases of negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides.
6. Equity has no place in condoning delay under Section 5, and delay cannot be condoned on grounds of sympathy or compassion.
7. Concepts like ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’, and ‘substantial justice’ cannot override the substantive law of limitation under Section 3.
8. The merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing appeals.
9. The High Court rightly exercised its discretion in refusing to condone the inordinate delay of 5659 days, given the claimants’ negligence and lack of due diligence.
10. Law of limitation bars stale matters from being revived by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
11. The Court must exercise discretion systematically and in an informed manner while allowing applications for condonation of delay.
12. The Court cannot condone delay merely because some persons obtained relief in similar matters if the cause shown for delay is unsatisfactory.
13. Imposition of conditions while condoning delay without finding sufficient cause is not the correct approach.
14. The orders condoning delay in other cases without spelling out the facts and reasons cannot be a ground for condoning delay in the present case.
15. The Supreme Court did not find any occasion to interfere with the High Court’s discretion in refusing to condone the inordinate delay.