Shiv Pratap Singh Rana

v.

State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.

(Criminal Appeal No. 1552 of 2023)

Facts:

1. The prosecutrix lodged an FIR on 06.09.2018 at Vishwavidhyalaya Police Station, District Gwalior, alleging that in 2016, the appellant, Shiv Pratap Singh Rana, threatened to upload her photographs on WhatsApp if she didn’t accompany him to Gwalior. The FIR was registered as Crime No. 401 of 2018 under Sections 376 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

2. The prosecutrix claimed that upon reaching Gwalior, the appellant forcefully committed a wrongful act on her in a rented premises at Anupam Nagar and made her sign an affidavit stating she would live with him for life. She alleged that this occurred after the appellant had taken her photographs while she was changing clothes after bathing at a temple near Kitore village.

3. According to the prosecutrix, the appellant initially promised to marry her after his brother’s marriage but later demanded Rs. 15 lakhs as dowry. She claimed to have given the appellant money and jewelry totaling Rs. 90,000 on various occasions, including a cheque of Rs. 10,000 from her mother’s account on 16.06.2017 and her sister’s mangalsutra pendant which he allegedly mortgaged for Rs. 8,000.

4. The prosecutrix stated that she had attended the appellant’s coaching center in Dabra during 2015-2016 along with her brother Mukul. The appellant was a friend of her younger brother and a distant relative of her brother-in-law. She claimed she got a job as a receptionist on the appellant’s recommendation.

5. Two stamp papers were allegedly obtained by the appellant – one on 28.09.2016 stating he would support the prosecutrix throughout her life, and another on 07.07.2017 expressing his desire to marry her.

6. The prosecutrix’s family members allegedly met the appellant’s family for marriage talks in June 2018 but were turned away. Community members reportedly urged the appellant and his family to return the jewelry and marry the prosecutrix, but they refused.

7. The appellant allegedly switched off his mobile phone and disappeared from Dabra after the marriage talks failed. The prosecutrix claimed the appellant’s brother threatened to kill her and implicate her brother in a false case if she complained to the police.

8. The FIR was lodged two years after the alleged incidents when the prosecutrix was about 24 years old. The parties had been in a relationship for almost two years before the FIR was lodged.

9. During the investigation, no photographs, mobile phone, jewelry, or other evidence was seized by the police to corroborate the prosecutrix’s claims.

10. The Sessions Judge framed charges against the appellant under Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 IPC and rejected his discharge application. The High Court dismissed the appellant’s criminal revision petition on 03.10.2019. The Supreme Court granted leave on 12.05.2023 and stayed the trial proceedings.

Law Points:

1. Section 375 IPC – Definition of rape: This section defines the offence of rape, including instances where consent is obtained by putting a person in fear of death or hurt, or when consent is given under a misconception of fact.

2. Section 376(2)(n) IPC – Rape committed repeatedly on the same woman: This provision deals with the specific offence of committing rape repeatedly on the same woman, carrying enhanced punishment.

3. Section 506 IPC – Criminal intimidation: This section defines and prescribes punishment for criminal intimidation, which includes threatening a person with injury to their person, reputation, or property.

4. Section 90 IPC – Consent given under fear or misconception: This section clarifies that consent given under fear of injury or misconception of fact is not valid consent as intended by the IPC.

5. Sections 161 and 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) – Recording of statements: These sections deal with the examination of witnesses by police and recording of confessions and statements by a Magistrate, respectively.

6. Section 227 CrPC – Discharge of accused: This provision allows for the discharge of an accused if the judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

7. Section 397 CrPC – Calling for records to exercise powers of revision: This section empowers the High Court or Sessions Court to call for records of proceedings to exercise its powers of revision.

8. Consent under Section 375 IPC: The law requires that consent for sexual acts must involve voluntary participation after exercising intelligence and choice.

9. Misconception of fact in the context of consent: The court must determine whether consent was obtained under a misconception of fact that vitiates the consent.

10. False promise of marriage vitiating consent: The law considers whether a false promise of marriage can vitiate consent for sexual relations.

11. Framing of charges – Prima facie view: The court must take a prima facie view based on available materials when deciding whether to frame charges.

12. Powers of revision court: The extent to which a revision court can interfere with an order framing charges.

13. Quashing of criminal proceedings: The grounds on which criminal proceedings can be quashed, including abuse of the process of court.

14. Delay in filing FIR in sexual offence cases: The legal implications of delay in filing an FIR in cases of sexual offences.

15. Evidentiary requirements in rape cases: The law regarding the type and quality of evidence required to prove charges of rape.

Arguments:

For the Appellant:

1. The relationship between the appellant and the prosecutrix was purely consensual, and there was no criminal element involved.
2. The significant delay of two years in filing the FIR indicates a false case and undermines the credibility of the allegations.
3. The lack of any seized evidence, such as photographs or the mobile phone, weakens the prosecution’s case substantially.
4. Contradictions in the prosecutrix’s statements under Sections 161 and 164 CrPC raise doubts about the veracity of her claims.
5. The appellant should not be subjected to the ignominy of a long trial based on weak and uncorroborated evidence.

For the Respondents:

1. There is sufficient prima facie material to frame charges against the appellant and conduct a full trial.
2. The appellant committed rape on the false promise of marriage, vitiating the consent given by the prosecutrix.
3. The consent obtained was under a misconception of fact, rendering it invalid as per Section 90 IPC.
4. The alleged blackmail using photographs constitutes a clear case of consent obtained under fear.
5. The repeated nature of the physical relationship indicates an offence under Section 376(2)(n) IPC, warranting a full trial.

Cases Cited:

1. Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 18 SCC 191
Law points:

– Interpretation of consent under Section 90 IPC
– Consent requires voluntary participation after the exercise of intelligence
– The court must carefully study all relevant circumstances to ascertain consent

2. Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 9 SCC 608
Law points:

– Consent under Section 375 IPC in the context of a false promise of marriage
– Two propositions to establish vitiation of consent by misconception of fact:
a) The promise of marriage must have been false, given in bad faith
b) The false promise must be of immediate relevance to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act

Judgment:

1. The Supreme Court held that the physical relationship between the prosecutrix and the appellant cannot be said to be against her will and without her consent, based on the available evidence and circumstances.

2. The Court found no case of rape or criminal intimidation made out on the available materials, emphasizing the lack of corroborative evidence to support the prosecutrix’s claims.

3. The relationship was deemed to appear consensual, which had likely soured, leading to the filing of the FIR after a significant delay of two years.

4. The Court opined that compelling the appellant to face trial would be an abuse of the court process, given the weak nature of the evidence and the circumstances of the case.

5. Significant weight was given to the fact that the prosecutrix voluntarily accompanied the appellant on multiple occasions, including to Gwalior and the temple, which was inconsistent with her allegations of threat or coercion.

6. The Court noted that no alarm was raised by the prosecutrix at any point during their interactions, further undermining her claims of non-consensual acts.

7. Importance was placed on the fact that the relationship continued even after the alleged forceful act, suggesting a consensual nature of the relationship.

8. The Court considered that both families had met to discuss marriage, indicating a relationship acknowledged by both parties and their families.

9. Emphasis was placed on the two-year delay in filing the FIR, which the Court viewed as suggestive of a consensual relationship that had deteriorated.

10. The lack of seized evidence, such as photographs, mobile phone, or jewelry, was highlighted as a significant weakness in the prosecution’s case.

11. The Court observed that the prosecutrix, being a major at the time of the alleged incidents, was deemed to be conscious of the consequences of her actions.

12. Contradictions in the prosecutrix’s statements under Sections 161 and 164 CrPC were noted as further weakening her credibility.

13. The Court concluded that the absence of key evidence made the possibility of conviction virtually impossible, rendering the case unfit even for trial.

14. Based on these findings, the Court set aside and quashed the orders of both the High Court and the Sessions Judge, effectively terminating the criminal proceedings against the appellant.

15. In its concluding remarks, the Court emphasized the need for careful scrutiny of consent in relationships that turn sour and the importance of corroborative evidence in cases alleging rape on the false promise of marriage.

This detailed synopsis provides a comprehensive overview of the case, including key facts, legal points, arguments, cited cases, and the court’s judgment, as requested.

Judgement : Shiv Pratap Singh Rana v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. S376 ,506 IPC

The post Recent Supreme Court Reportable case summary: Shiv Pratap Singh Rana v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. (Criminal Appeal No. 1552 of 2023:Sections 376 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code) first appeared on Patras Law Chamber.

Criminal Appeal No. 3350 of 2024,

[2024] 8 S.C.R. 332 : 2024 INSC 601

Date of Judgment:
13 August 2024

Judges:
B.R. Gavai, Sanjay Karol, K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.

YOUTUBE Summary:

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Key Facts:

1. The appellant, James Kunjwal, was accused under Sections 376 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) by the second respondent (a woman) for engaging in a relationship under the false pretext of marriage.
2. An FIR was lodged on 2 May 2021, accusing the appellant of rape and criminal intimidation.
3. The appellant sought bail from the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Nainital, which was rejected.
4. Subsequently, the appellant’s bail was granted by the High Court of Uttarakhand on 8 June 2021.
5. The complainant filed a bail cancellation application, alleging that the appellant had misrepresented facts in his bail application.
6. The High Court dismissed the application but observed that the appellant had intentionally filed a false affidavit.
7. The High Court directed the Registrar (Judicial) to file a complaint against the appellant under Section 193 IPC for filing a false affidavit.
8. The appellant challenged this order in the Supreme Court, arguing that his statements did not meet the threshold for perjury under Section 193 IPC.
9. The complainant alleged that the appellant continued to harass her via WhatsApp, despite a police warning.
10. The Supreme Court evaluated whether the false affidavit constituted an offense under Section 193 IPC.

Legal Points:

1. Section 191 IPC: Defines false evidence as making false statements under oath or by law.
2. Section 193 IPC: Punishes giving false evidence or fabricating evidence in judicial proceedings.
3. Section 195(1)(b) CrPC: Specifies that no court shall take cognizance of offenses under Section 193 IPC unless a complaint is made by the concerned court.
4. Threshold for Perjury: The Supreme Court noted that perjury must involve deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance, not mere inaccuracies.
5. Expediency in the Interest of Justice: Legal proceedings under Section 193 IPC should only be initiated when it is expedient in the interest of justice, not for trivial inaccuracies.
6. Judicial Precedents: Cited several cases (e.g., Chajoo Ram v. Radhey Shyam, Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah) to affirm that perjury prosecution must be based on strong grounds, not mere suspicion.
7. Prima Facie Case: A prima facie case must be established before proceeding with perjury charges.
8. Contradictory Affidavits: The High Court based its observations on conflicting statements made by the complainant and the appellant in their affidavits.
9. Protection against Malicious Prosecution: The Supreme Court emphasized the need to avoid prosecuting individuals for perjury without solid evidence.
10. Denial as Defense: The appellant’s defense rested on the argument that his denial of allegations did not constitute false evidence.

Arguments:

• Appellant (James Kunjwal):
  Argued that his denial of allegations did not meet the criteria for perjury under Section 193 IPC. He cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Iqbal Singh Marwah to assert that mere denial does not amount to a deliberate falsehood.
• Respondents (State of Uttarakhand & Complainant):
  Argued that the appellant had intentionally filed a false affidavit and continued to harass the complainant through social media despite the bail conditions.

Cited Cases:

1. Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah (2005): Established that perjury should only be prosecuted when there is clear and deliberate falsehood.
2. Chajoo Ram v. Radhey Shyam (1971): Emphasized that prosecution for perjury should be initiated only in cases where there is a deliberate attempt to deceive the court.
3. R.S. Sujatha v. State of Karnataka (2011): Stressed that the court must be convinced of the expediency of prosecution before proceeding with perjury charges.
4. Bhima Razu Prasad v. State Rep. by Deputy Superintendent of Police, CBI (2021): Clarified that false statements made in judicial proceedings attract Section 193 IPC only when they are deliberate and intended to mislead the court.

Judgment Points:

1. The Supreme Court held that the appellant’s affidavit did not meet the threshold for perjury under Section 193 IPC.
2. Mere inaccuracies or denials in affidavits do not constitute perjury unless there is clear evidence of deliberate falsehood.
3. The appellant’s statements were found to be denials of the complainant’s version, not intentional falsehoods.
4. The Court found no malafide intent in the appellant’s affidavit.
5. The High Court’s order directing the Registrar to file a complaint under Section 193 IPC was set aside.
6. The Court emphasized that prosecution for perjury should be initiated only in exceptional circumstances.
7. The Court reaffirmed that perjury requires more than mere suspicion or inaccurate statements.
8. The Court clarified that the decision in this case would not impact the criminal trial pending against the appellant.
9. The judgment referenced the principle that prosecution under Section 193 IPC should be reserved for cases where justice demands it.
10. The appeal was allowed, and the proceedings against the appellant were quashed.

Judgement pdf:

James Kunjwal v. State of Uttarakhand & Anr.,

The post Recent Supreme Court Reportable case:James Kunjwal v. State of Uttarakhand & Anr. defines the offense of perjury under S.194 IPC first appeared on Patras Law Chamber.

Facts :

1. The deceased, Amrik Kaur, was married to the appellant, Darshan Singh.
2. The prosecution alleged that Darshan Singh had an illicit relationship with Rani Kaur (A2) for about three years.
3. On the intervening night of 18.05.1999 and 19.05.1999, Darshan Singh and Rani Kaur allegedly administered poison to Amrik Kaur, causing her death.
4. The prosecution’s case rested on circumstantial evidence.
5. The key witnesses were PW-3 (Melo Kaur, the deceased’s cousin’s sister) and PW-4 (Gurmel Singh, PW-3’s husband).
6. PW-3 claimed to have seen Darshan Singh and Rani Kaur leaving the appellant’s house on the morning of 19.05.1999.
7. PW-4 claimed to have seen Darshan Singh and Rani Kaur entering the appellant’s house on the evening of 18.05.1999.
8. PW-5, an independent witness, claimed to have seen Darshan Singh and Rani Kaur leaving in a jeep on the morning of 19.05.1999.
9. The appellant claimed that Amrik Kaur had committed suicide by consuming poison.
10. The Trial Court convicted both Darshan Singh and Rani Kaur under Section 302/34 IPC.
11. The High Court upheld Darshan Singh’s conviction but acquitted Rani Kaur.
12. The State did not challenge Rani Kaur’s acquittal.
13. The cause of death was aluminium phosphide poisoning, as per the chemical examiner’s report.
14. The appellant argued that aluminium phosphide has a pungent smell and cannot be administered deceitfully.
15. There were no injury marks on the deceased’s body, suggesting no forceful administration of poison.

Law Points :

16. In cases of circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must be cogently and firmly established, forming a complete chain unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused.
17. The circumstances should be inconsistent with any hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused.
18. Minor contradictions or inconsistencies in the testimony of a rustic/illiterate witness should not lead to discarding their evidence entirely.
19. However, significant omissions and improvements in the testimony of a witness cannot be ignored, even if the witness is rustic/illiterate.
20. If a witness does not mention a fact in their statement under Section 161 CrPC, their subsequent statement regarding that fact during trial cannot be relied upon.
21. The statement of an accused under Section 313 CrPC is not ‘evidence’ and cannot form the sole basis of conviction.
22. The accused has only to create a doubt, and the prosecution must then establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt.
23. Mere omission to take a specific plea by the accused under Section 313 CrPC does not denude them of their right if the same can be made out otherwise.
24. In cases of circumstantial evidence, if a single circumstance is not cogently proved, it can cause a snap in the chain of circumstances, entitling the accused to the benefit of doubt.
25. If some circumstances in the chain can be explained by another reasonable hypothesis, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt.
26. In cases where the offence is committed inside a house, the burden on the prosecution is comparatively lighter, and the inmates have a corresponding burden to offer a cogent explanation under Section 106 of the Evidence Act.
27. If an accused offers a false explanation or remains silent, it can become an additional link in the chain of circumstances.
28. The standard of proof for an accused in support of their defence under Section 313 CrPC is not beyond reasonable doubt.
29. When multiple accused are tried together, and one is acquitted, the evidence against the other accused must be scrutinized independently.
30. If the evidence against one accused is found to be insufficient, the same evidence cannot be relied upon against the other accused.

Judgement :

31. The Supreme Court found that the presence of Darshan Singh and Rani Kaur in the appellant’s house on the intervening night of 18.05.1999 and 19.05.1999 was not firmly and cogently established.
32. There were several omissions and improvements in the testimony of PW-3 and PW-4, which seriously dented their credibility.
33. The Court found that the prosecution had not proved the circumstance of presence beyond reasonable doubt.
34. The Court held that there was a strong hypothesis that the deceased had committed suicide, which explanation was led by the appellant in his statement under Section 313 CrPC, and it was sufficient to create doubt.
35. The Court found it perverse that the High Court had distinguished the case of the appellant from that of Rani Kaur, who was acquitted, despite relying on the same evidence to prove their presence.
36. As the presence was not proved cogently, the Court held that it caused a snap in the chain of circumstances, entitling the appellant to the benefit of doubt.
37. The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the concurrent findings of conviction against the appellant.
38. The Court did not consider the other circumstances sought to be proved by the prosecution, as the failure to prove a single circumstance cogently can cause a snap in the chain of circumstances.
39. The Court held that when the conviction is based solely on circumstantial evidence, there should not be any snap in the chain of circumstances.
40. If there is a snap in the chain, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt.

The post Supreme Court reportable case: Darshan Singh v State of Punjab ([2024] 1 S.C.R. 248 : 2024 INSC 19) 4th Jan,2024 first appeared on Patras Law Chamber.

Pathupati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. v. The Special Deputy Collector (LA)

[Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 31248 of 2018] 08 April 2024

[Bela M. Trivedi and Pankaj Mithal,* JJ.]

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 241 : 2024 INSC 286

SUBJECT: Limitation Act 1963

Issue for Consideration

Whether the High Court was justified in refusing to condone the delay of 5659 days in filing the proposed appeal against the judgment of the reference court under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, by some of the Legal Representatives of a deceased Claimant who died pending the reference and who were not impleaded in the reference proceeding.

Judgement Synopsis:

15 Facts Points:

1. Land in Gandluru village, Guntur District, Andhra Pradesh was acquired in 1989 for the Telugu Ganga Project.

2. In L.A.O.P. No. 38 of 1990, there were 16 claimants, and during the pendency of the reference, claimants No. 1, 3, and 11 died.

3. No steps were taken to substitute the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased claimants.

4. The reference was dismissed on merits by a common judgment and order dated 24.09.1999, upholding the Collector’s award.

5. After 5/6 years, some legal representatives of the deceased claimant No. 11 proposed to file an appeal with a delay of 5659 days.

6. No other claimant or their legal heirs joined the proposed appeal.

7. An application was filed for condonation of the delay of 5659 days in filing the proposed appeal.

8. The explanation given was that the surviving daughter of the deceased claimant No. 11 came to know about the dismissal of the reference on 28.05.2015.

9. The High Court refused to condone the delay and dismissed the application as barred by limitation.

10. The present Special Leave Petition challenges the High Court’s order refusing to condone the delay.

11. The Law of Limitation is based on public policy and the maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” (there must be an end to litigation).

12. Section 3 of the Limitation Act is mandatory, and Section 5 is discretionary, allowing condonation of delay upon showing sufficient cause.

13. Liberal interpretation of “sufficient cause” cannot override the substantive law of limitation under Section 3.

14. The merits of the case cannot be considered while deciding the condonation of delay.

15. The High Court’s discretion in refusing to condone the inordinate delay was justified due to the claimants’ negligence and lack of due diligence.

20 Law Points:

1. The law of limitation is founded on public policy and enshrined in the legal maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation).

2. Statutes of limitation and prescription are statutes of peace and repose, envisaging that a right not exercised or remedy not availed for a long time ceases to exist.

3. Section 3 of the Limitation Act is a substantive provision of mandatory nature and needs to be interpreted strictly.

4. Section 5 of the Limitation Act is a discretionary provision and has to be interpreted liberally, as it helps courts do substantial justice.

5. The existence of ‘sufficient cause’ for condoning delay is a condition precedent to exercise the discretionary power to condone delay under Section 5.

6. Even after ‘sufficient cause’ is established, the court has discretion to allow or dismiss the application for condonation of delay based on the bona fides of the party.

7. The discretion to condone delay will not be exercised when the delay is caused by negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides.

8. Equity has no place in condoning delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

9. Courts cannot condone delay on grounds of sympathy or compassion if mandatory provisions are not complied with.

10. Concepts like ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’, and ‘substantial justice’ cannot override the substantive law of limitation under Section 3.

11. The merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing appeals.

12. Law of limitation bars time-barred remedy rather than the right itself with the passage of time.

13. The interplay between Sections 3 and 5 requires that Section 3 be construed strictly, and Section 5 be construed liberally.

14. The discretionary power to condone delay under Section 5 may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established, based on factors like inordinate delay, negligence, and lack of due diligence.

15. Merely obtaining relief in similar matters does not entitle others to the same benefit if the cause shown for delay is unsatisfactory.

16. Delay condonation applications must be decided based on the parameters laid down for condoning delay, and not by disregarding statutory provisions.

17. The court has to exercise discretion systematically and in an informed manner while allowing applications for condonation of delay.

18. Imposition of conditions while condoning delay without finding sufficient cause is not the correct approach.

19. The law of limitation bars stale matters from being revived by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

20. The court cannot ignore the statutory provision of limitation to relieve distress resulting from its operation.

15 Judgement Points:

1. The law of limitation is based on public policy enshrined in the maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” (there must be an end to litigation).

2. Statutes of limitation are statutes of peace and repose, barring remedy rather than the right with the passage of time.

3. Section 3 of the Limitation Act, being a substantive provision of mandatory nature, needs to be interpreted strictly.

4. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, being a discretionary provision, has to be interpreted liberally, but the existence of ‘sufficient cause’ is a condition precedent for condoning delay.

5. Discretionary power to condone delay under Section 5 may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established, in cases of negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides.

6. Equity has no place in condoning delay under Section 5, and delay cannot be condoned on grounds of sympathy or compassion.

7. Concepts like ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’, and ‘substantial justice’ cannot override the substantive law of limitation under Section 3.

8. The merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing appeals.

9. The High Court rightly exercised its discretion in refusing to condone the inordinate delay of 5659 days, given the claimants’ negligence and lack of due diligence.

10. Law of limitation bars stale matters from being revived by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

11. The Court must exercise discretion systematically and in an informed manner while allowing applications for condonation of delay.

12. The Court cannot condone delay merely because some persons obtained relief in similar matters if the cause shown for delay is unsatisfactory.

13. Imposition of conditions while condoning delay without finding sufficient cause is not the correct approach.

14. The orders condoning delay in other cases without spelling out the facts and reasons cannot be a ground for condoning delay in the present case.

15. The Supreme Court did not find any occasion to interfere with the High Court’s discretion in refusing to condone the inordinate delay.

The post Supreme Court Reportable Case:Pathupati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. v. The Special Deputy Collector (LA)[2024] 4 S.C.R. 241 : 2024 INSC 286, [Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 31248 of 2018] 08 April 2024 first appeared on Patras Law Chamber.

1. The appellants (father and son) were prosecuted for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
2. The incident occurred on 17th September 1996, where the appellants allegedly assaulted one Punjabhai (the deceased) with pipes and sticks, leading to his death.
3. The Sessions Court acquitted the appellants by a judgment dated 5th July 1997.
4. The State of Gujarat preferred an appeal against the acquittal before the High Court.
5. The High Court, by the impugned judgment dated 14th December 2018, converted the acquittal into a conviction for offences under Sections 302 read with 34 and 323 of the IPC.
6. PW-1 Danabhai, the brother of the deceased, was informed about the assault by one Vajsurbhai.
7. PW-4 Karshanbhai, an eyewitness, claimed to have been present during the incident and sustained injuries.
8. There were inconsistencies between the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-4 regarding the presence of PW-4 at the time of the incident.
9. PW-4 admitted to having an ongoing land dispute with the appellants’ family.
10. The Trial Court disbelieved the testimony of PW-4 for various reasons, including the inconsistency with PW-5 Dr. Jagadishbhai’s statement.
11. The High Court relied on PW-4’s police statement and held that the appellants failed to adduce evidence to falsify the prosecution’s version.
12. The Supreme Court granted exemption to the second appellant from surrendering.
13. The Supreme Court continued the order granting exemption to the second appellant from surrendering.
14. The application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail by the first appellant was rejected by the Supreme Court.
15. The Supreme Court directed the present appeal to be listed for hearing.

Law Points including Both Parties’ Submissions:

1. The appellants’ counsel pointed out that the High Court erred in relying on PW-4’s police statement and erroneously put the burden on the appellants to prove their innocence.
2. The appellants’ counsel submitted that the High Court’s approach in dealing with an appeal against acquittal was completely erroneous.
3. The appellants’ counsel argued that the High Court did not find that the only possible view based on the evidence was that the guilt of the appellants had been proved.
4. The State counsel vehemently submitted that in an appeal against acquittal, the High Court was duty-bound to reappreciate the evidence.
5. The State counsel argued that after finding PW-4’s evidence inspiring confidence, the High Court rightly interfered with the order of acquittal.
6. The Supreme Court observed that the Appellate Court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if satisfied that the only possible conclusion was the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
7. The Supreme Court held that the Appellate Court cannot overturn an order of acquittal merely on the ground that another view is possible.
8. The Supreme Court noted that the High Court did not address whether the Trial Court’s view was a plausible view based on the evidence.
9. The Supreme Court found the High Court’s finding on the burden of proof to be completely erroneous.
10. The Supreme Court held that unless there is a negative burden or reverse onus clause, the accused is not required to discharge any burden.
11. The Supreme Court observed that the burden was on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
12. The Supreme Court noted inconsistencies between the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-4 regarding PW-4’s presence at the time of the incident.
13. The Supreme Court considered the prior enmity between PW-4 and the appellants’ family and PW-4’s failure to report the incident to the police.
14. The Supreme Court found that the Trial Court’s finding that PW-4’s evidence did not inspire confidence was a possible finding based on the evidence.
15. The Supreme Court held that there was no reason for the High Court to overturn the order of acquittal when the Trial Court’s findings were possible.

Judgement Points:

1. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and order of the High Court.
2. The Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the appellants.
3. The Supreme Court restored the judgment and order of the Trial Court acquitting the appellants.
4. The Supreme Court held that the Appellate Court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if satisfied that the only possible conclusion was the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
5. The Supreme Court observed that the Appellate Court cannot overturn an order of acquittal merely on the ground that another view is possible.
6. The Supreme Court found that the High Court did not avert if the Trial Court’s view was a plausible view based on the evidence.
7. The Supreme Court held that the High Court ignored that an order of acquittal further strengthens the presumption of innocence of the accused.
8. The Supreme Court found the High Court’s finding on the burden of proof to be completely erroneous.
9. The Supreme Court held that unless there is a negative burden or reverse onus clause, the accused is not required to discharge any burden.
10. The Supreme Court observed that the burden was on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
11. The Supreme Court noted inconsistencies between the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-4 regarding PW-4’s presence at the time of the incident.
12. The Supreme Court considered the prior enmity between PW-4 and the appellants’ family and PW-4’s failure to report the incident to the police.
13. The Supreme Court found that the Trial Court’s finding that PW-4’s evidence did not inspire confidence was a possible finding based on the evidence.
14. The Supreme Court held that there was no reason for the High Court to overturn the order of acquittal when the Trial Court’s findings were possible.
15. The Supreme Court cancelled the bail bonds of the second appellant and ordered the first appellant to be forthwith set at liberty unless required in another case.

The post Supreme Court Reportable Cases: Bhupatbhai Bachubhai Chavda & Anr. v.State of Gujarat(Criminal Appeal No. 334 of 2019)10 April 2024[Abhay S. Oka* and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.][2024] 4 S.C.R. 322 : 2024 INSC 295: The Supreme Court observed that the Appellate Court cannot overturn an order of acquittal merely on the ground that another view is possible. first appeared on Patras Law Chamber.

Supreme Court References:

• Criminal Appeal No. 3851 of 2023
• Judgment and Order dated 14.02.2022 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in WP No. 2592 of 2021

Points of Facts:

1. M/s. SBM Paper Mills Private Limited (Corporate Debtor) filed a petition under Section 10 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) for initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP).
2. The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), Mumbai Bench, admitted the petition and appointed an Interim Resolution Professional (RP).
3. Mr. Satyanarayan Malu, the Respondent/Ex-Director of the Corporate Debtor, filed an application for withdrawal of the petition under Section 12A in light of a One Time Settlement (OTS) with the sole Financial Creditor, Allahabad Bank.
4. The NCLT allowed the withdrawal application based on the consent of the Financial Creditor.
5. Due to non-compliance with the terms of the OTS by the Respondents, the NCLT found it a fit case to prosecute the Respondents.
6. The Appellant-Board (Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India) filed a complaint against the Respondents before the Sessions Judge under Sections 73(a) and 235A of the IBC.
7. The Sessions Judge directed issuance of process against the Respondents.
8. The Respondents filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging the Sessions Judge’s order for want of jurisdiction.
9. The High Court allowed the writ petition, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

Points of Law:

1. The issue was whether the Special Court under the IBC would be as provided under Section 435 of the Companies Act, 2013 as it existed when the IBC came into effect, or as provided under Section 435 after the 2018 Amendment.
2. The reference to ‘Special Court established under Chapter XXVIII of the Companies Act, 2013’ in Section 236(1) of the IBC is ‘legislation by incorporation’ or ‘legislation by reference’.
3. The effect of ‘legislation by incorporation’ is that the provisions are bodily lifted from one enactment and made part of another, such that the repeal of the former does not affect the latter.
4. In the case of ‘legislation by reference’, the amendment or repeal of the provisions of the Act referred to in a subsequent Act will bear the effect of the amendment or repeal.
5. The distinction between ‘legislation by incorporation’ and ‘legislation by reference’ was discussed in various Supreme Court cases, including Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty and Anr., Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa, and Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India and another.
6. The principle of ‘legislation by incorporation’ has been applied in cases where a provision of one statute is incorporated in another, and any subsequent amendment in the former statute or even its total repeal would not affect the provision as incorporated in the latter statute.
7. The Supreme Court has held in various cases, including Girnar Traders (3) v. State of Maharashtra and others, that if the legislature intended a general reference, it would have said so, but a specific reference indicates ‘legislation by incorporation’.
8. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the IBC is a self-contained Code.

Points of Judgment:

1. The reference in Section 236(1) of the IBC is specific and not general, indicating a case of ‘legislation by incorporation’ and not ‘legislation by reference’.
2. The provision regarding the Special Court has been bodily lifted from Section 435 of the Companies Act, 2013 and incorporated in Section 236(1) of the IBC.
3. Any amendment to Section 435 of the Companies Act, 2013, after the IBC came into effect would not have any effect on the provisions of Section 236(1) of the IBC.
4. At the time of the IBC’s enactment, the Special Court consisted of a person qualified to be a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge.
5. The reasoning of the High Court that only offenses under the Companies Act would be tried by a Special Court of Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge, and all other offenses, including under the IBC, shall be tried by a Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, is untenable.
6. The High Court erred in quashing the complaint solely on the ground that it was filed before a Special Court presided by a Sessions Judge.
7. The Supreme Court held that the Special Court presided by a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge would have jurisdiction to try the complaint under the IBC.
8. The matter was remitted to the High Court for considering the Respondents’ petition afresh on merits.

Arguments Forwarded by the Parties:

Arguments by the Appellant-Board:

• The reference in Section 236(1) of the IBC is specific, indicating ‘legislation by incorporation’.
• If the legislative intent was ‘legislation by reference’, a general reference would have been made.
• Subsequent amendments to the Companies Act, 2013 would not affect the IBC if it is a case of ‘legislation by incorporation’.
• The Code is a complete Code in itself, and the provisions should be interpreted based on the legislative intent at the time of enactment.

Arguments by the Respondents:

• The point of ‘legislation by incorporation’ was not argued before the High Court and should not be allowed to be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court.
• The judgments cited by the Appellant-Board regarding ‘legislation by incorporation’ are not applicable to the present case.
• Applying the test laid down in Girnar Traders (3) v. State of Maharashtra and others, the present case is one of ‘legislation by reference’.
• The respondents have a good case on merits, and the matter should be remitted to the High Court for deciding it afresh on merits.

Judgments Cited:

1. Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty and Anr. [1962] 3 SCR 786
2. Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1975] 2 SCR 138
3. Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India and another [1979] 2 SCR 1038
4. Girnar Traders (3) v. State of Maharashtra and others [2007] 9 SCR 383
5. New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Allahabad & Ors. [1971] 2 SCR 92
6. Ujagar Prints and others v. Union of India and others [1989] 1 SCR 344
7. Innoventive Industries Limited v. ICICI Bank and another [2017] 8 SCR 33
8. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax v. Monnet Ispat and Energy Limited (2018) 18 SCC 786
9. E.S. Krishnamurthy and others v. Bharath Hi-Tech Builders Private Limited [2021] 12 SCR 28
10. Pratap Technocrats Private Limited and others v. Monitoring Committee of Reliance Infratel Limited and another [2021] 8 SCR 938
11. V. Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat and Power Limited and others [2021] 14 SCR 736
12. Embassy Property Developments Private Limited v. State of Karnataka and others [2019] 17 SCR 559
13. Bharti Airtel Ltd. and another v. Vijaykumar V. Iyer and others [2024] 1 SCR 140

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Section 236(1) of the IBC is ‘legislation by incorporation’, affirming that Special Courts under the IBC are presided over by Sessions Judges, and remanded the case to the High Court for reconsideration on merits.

The post Supreme Court Reportable Case : Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India v. Satyanarayan Bankatlal Malu & Ors. Court: Supreme Court of India (Citation: [2024] 5 S.C.R. 1 : 2024 INSC 319) first appeared on Patras Law Chamber.

Facts:

1. This case pertains to an acid attack on the victim (appellant) by the convicted persons (respondents).
2. The victim suffered 30-40% burn injuries, resulting in total disfigurement of her face.
3. The respondents were convicted under Sections 307/149 and 326A/149 of the IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment.
4. The High Court suspended the sentence and granted bail to the respondents.

Points of Law:

1. Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC) deals with the suspension of the execution of a sentence pending appeal and the release of the appellant on bail.
2. The provision mandates recording reasons in writing for suspending the sentence and granting bail.
3. The Court must objectively assess the matter and record reasons for concluding that the case warrants suspension of sentence and grant of bail.
4. Relevant factors to be considered include the nature of the offense, the gravity of the offense, and the desirability of releasing the convict on bail.
5. Mere incarceration for a particular period and the likelihood of delay in disposing of appeals cannot be the sole reasons for invoking Section 389 in cases of life imprisonment for serious offenses.

Arguments:

Appellant’s Arguments:

– The High Court order reflects non-application of mind and non-consideration of relevant factors for invoking Section 389.
– An acid attack can permanently disfigure the victim, stripping them of their basic human right to live a decent life.

Respondents’ Arguments:

– They offered to pay Rs. 25 lakhs as compensation to the victim for her medical treatment.
– The evidence showed that the victim had incurred Rs. 21 lakhs for her treatment.
– Considering the long custody and the delay in hearing the appeals, the sentence should be suspended.

Other Cases Cited:

1. Bhagwan Rama Shinde Gosai & Ors. v. State of Gujarat [1999] 3 SCR 545
2. Kishori Lal v. Rupa & Ors. [2004] Supp. 4 SCR 628
3. Anwari Begum v. Sher Mohammad & Anr. [2005] Supp. 3 SCR 287
4. Khilari v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. [2009] 1 SCR 543
5. State of Haryana v. Hasmat [2004] Supp. 3 SCR 132

Judgment:

1. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order suspending the sentence and granting bail to the respondents.
2. The Court held that the High Court failed to consider the relevant factors and committed non-application of mind.
3. The Court emphasized that an acid attack can permanently disfigure the victim, stripping them of their basic human rights.
4. The mere offer of compensation by the respondents cannot be a ground for suspending the sentence in such a heinous crime.
5. The respondents were directed to surrender within four days, failing which they would be re-arrested and committed to custody.

The judgment highlights the importance of considering the gravity of the offense, the impact on the victim, and other relevant factors while suspending a sentence under Section 389 of the Cr.PC, especially in cases of heinous crimes like acid attacks.

The post Supreme Court latest Reportable Case:Shivani Tyagi v. State of U.P. & Anr. [2024] 5 S.C.R. 36 (Criminal Appeal Nos.1957-1961 of 2024): 05 APRIL 2024 :Held that The key law point from this judgment is that in heinous crimes like acid attacks resulting in permanent disfigurement, mere offer of compensation or likelihood of delay cannot be the sole grounds for suspending the sentence of life imprisonment under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure without considering the relevant factors like nature and gravity of the offense. first appeared on Patras Law Chamber.